Books by splitShops

Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations - Paperback

$64.80

Tax not included.
Shipping calculated at checkout.

In stock

Order Note:

Purchase Information

Shipping charges, applicable taxes, the final order total, and available payment methods are shown during checkout before payment. Delivery timing varies by item and fulfillment origin. Standard U.S. returns are by mail for eligible new, unopened items within 30 days of carrier delivery. Customers pay standard return shipping; there is no restocking fee. Approved refunds are issued within 5 business days after the return is received and inspected. Standard exchanges are not offered.

Cindi Book items have a flat $9.99 shipping charge. Shopify Collective items use shipping rates set by the supplier. Orders containing items from different fulfillment sources may include more than one shipping charge. Your full shipping total is shown at checkout before payment.

Return eligibility is subject to the full policy. Opened, read, or unsealed books with broken seals or visible wear are final sale. Digital downloads, gift cards, and personalized products are non-refundable. Original shipping charges are not refunded for standard returns. Contact us within 7 days of delivery about damaged, defective, or incorrect items.

by Peter D. Feaver (Author)

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior.

This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
Number of Pages: 400
Dimensions: 0.98 x 8.92 x 5.88 IN
Publication Date: March 15, 2005

Pay with

  • Amazon
  • Apple Pay
  • Diners Club
  • Discover
  • Google Pay
  • Mastercard
  • PayPal
  • Shop Pay
  • Visa

Available payment methods and your final total are shown at checkout before payment.

$64.80